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THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION~ SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
NATIVE FOREST POLICY IN CHILE AND VENEZUELA

The debate over the fate of Latin American native forests has subtly shifted in recent
years. For most of the last two decades studies analyzed the causes of what seemed to be the
inexorable forces of deforestation. As of the middle of the 1980s, however, Latin American
governments have increasingly embraced the rhetoric of conservation and sustainable
development. The emergence of more environmentally conscious native forest policies in a
number of countries has accompanied that change. This raises two questions. What factors
influence a government's policy choices in this issue area; and what accounts for the degree
of politicization of native forest policy? The few studies that have addressed these questions
usually focus on the impact of a single variable-'...they adopt either international, technocratic
and state centric, or society centric explanations. This paper argues that a fuller
understanding of the politics of native forest policy requires broadening the focus to an
examination of when and how ideas, state institutions, societal forces, and external factors
influence policy outcomes.
The Chilean and Venezuelan cases suggest that the ideas of cohesive teams of experts
give initial impetus to the policies, and that their state institutional power bases are crucial
for the translation of those ideas into policy. Yet, although teams of like-minded progressive
policymakers had solid ministerial backing in both cases, policy outcomes differed. Chile's
'

'

policymakers settled for a more market-oriented approach in a highly politicized debate.
Their Venezuelan counterparts developed a more holistic and integrated approach with far
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less political conflict. Without negating the value of other factors, the available evidence
suggests that political economic factors--specifically, the economic interests of powerful
social actors--must be taken into account as well. The fact that Chile had an economically
important private sector forestry industry and that Venezuela did not, accounts for a
significant portion of the difference. Moreover, for the most part, external factors played a
permissive, background role in both cases.

EXPLAINING THE POLITICS OF CONSERVATION AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT

This paper examines when and how four different factors influenced policy outcomes
in the Chilean native forest debate: ideas, institutions, social groups,· and external conditions.
This methodology builds on recent work about political and economic change that has called
attention to the relative futility of seeking to determine which one of these factors has more
overall explanatory power. 1 In order to achieve this objective, the paper explores the utility
of synthesizing an emerging literature that has tackled the question of the determinants of
environmental politics from two different theoretical approaches.

Following state-centric approaches, Peter Haas focused on the role of ideas and the
institutional capacity of the state to explain environmental policy outcomes. 2 He argued that
networks of experts in government agencies who are bound together by shared values,
knowledge, and policy recommendations--epistemic communities--shape the state's response
to environmental problems. Differences in policy cohesiveness and extensiveness depended
on the relative autonomy from social forces of the institution charged with developing the
policy.
2

Haas made a significant contribution to the debate. But this approach has two
shortcomings. First, it only looks at the relationship of specific interest groups to the state
and ignores the effect of broader social coalitions that may support or oppose proposed
policy. Secondly, the epistemic community approach has not taken into account the
politicization of environmental issues. There is no one technocratic solution to a problem.
This leaves the door open for alliance building between conflicting groups, including social
groups and external actors. These groups and actors may seek allies within state institutions
that do not support the objectives of the ministry in charge of forest policy.
A second explanatory approach focuses on the role th~t social groups and international
factors play in forcing recalcitrant governments to adopt policies that promote the
conservation and sustainable development of native forests. 3 The main problem with this
approach is that the state itself remains a black box. Because they concentrated on the
sources of resistance to destructive policies and the imposition of more benevolent policy
upon the state, these studies say little if anything about the role of state actors in devising
environmentally conscious native forest policy.
Given the limitations of these approaches when taken individually, this paper explores
two hypothesis about when and how ideas, state institutions, social groups, and international
factors influenced native forest policy in Chile and Venezuela. One hypothesis is that, other
things being equal, policy tends to reflect the preferences of the epistemic community that
controls the government agencies responsible for designing it. This requires a cohesive
technical team and firm backing by the ministry in which they are housed. A second
hypothesis addresses the reasons for the relative lack of fit between an epistemic
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community's policy preference and actual outcome. It contends that politicization occurs
when the incumbent epistemic community has views that differ from the dominant marketfriendly approach to the forest issue. But the point only holds when coupled with the
presence of well-developed private interests in the sector who draw their power from the
economic importance of the forest sector for the national economy. These conditions affect
both the interest and power that competing groups may have in forest policy. A strong
private sector forest industry may deflect the ideas proposed by the incumbent epistemic
community by forming alliances with competing epistemic communities (which had different
views on how to deal with environmental issues) in other ministries and with broader
political and social forces.
International variables, mostly played background and conditioning roles. In general,
Chilean and Venezuelan policymakers were responding to growing II green II conditionality.
That is, foreign trade and aid issues were increasingly being linked to action on
environmental issues. Both countries also wanted to put a good face on their intervention at
the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in the Summer of 1992. Moreover, many of the central
concepts contending groups used were adopted from debates in developed nations. In
Venezuela, however, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) played a direct
role in shaping a biosphere reserve project in the state of Amazonas.

Competing Conceptualizations of Sustainable Development
Central to this paper's argument over the direction and politicization of native forest
policy is the existence of at least two competing conceptualizations of sustainable
development. They stand at the core of the political debates, conflicts, and struggles over
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how to deal with environmental and ecological problems. The concept of sustainable
development attempts to make compatible development and environmental integrity. It was
forged in the 1980s in an effort to bridge a widening gap between preservationists and the
necessity of further economic development. The well-documented effects of poverty on
environmental degradation first gave birth to the concept, as conceived and popularized by
the Brundtland Commission. 4 The report stressed the search for a style of economic
development capable of meeting the basic needs of a developing country's population, while
maintaining its stock of natural resources so as not to rob future generations of their use. 5
For policy and programmatic purposes, development economists have broken the concept of
sustainable development down into three interrelated components: a healthy growing
economy (which may necessitate structural adjustment), a commitment to social equity (or
meeting basic needs), and protection of the environment. 6
From this generally shared conceptual basis, environmental policies, programs, and
projects--including those related to the forest--have tended to cluster around two distinct
conceptualizations of the relationship between economic growth, equity, and environment.
The dominant view within the policy establishment, shared by the top government leadership
and multilateral institutions, reduces equity and environmental considerations to marketfriendly economic growth. 7 To achieve rapid growth developing countries must build
market economies, integrate them into world markets, and pay careful attention to private
property rights. From this perspective the environmental consequences of economic
development are considered to be unfortunate side-effects that must be ameliorated.
Consequently, the solution is limited to the addition of technologies capable of mitigating the
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environmental impact of industrial processes, rather than finding substitutes for them or
alternative methods of production. 8 Social equity concerns and their link to environment
receive even less direct attention. At its baldest, this perspective argues that aggregate
economic growth brought about by structural reforms will improve national income (and
therefore housing, education, and wealth), and that rising income levels will allow people to
become concerned about environmental degradation.
These views inspire a number of policy prescriptions for the use of natural renewable
resources. Multilateral lending institutions now require the addition of II environmental"
safeguards to large scale development projects in forestry that will provide employment and
national income to boost gross domestic product (GDP) growth figures and to pay back
onerous international loans.9 A number of studies have advocated the promotion. of private
property rights over cooperative ventures and communal ownership, elimination of
government subsidies that make deforestation profitable, reducing the role of the state to
minimize the impact of bureaucratic incompetence, and then strengthening institutional
capacities in sharply reduced spheres of state action. 10
The market-friendly approach to sustainable development also focuses more directly
on the economic value of trees rather than the multiple values of native forests. Thus, its
environmental consciousness stresses preservation of selected native forest tracts for the
conservation of biodiversity with clear-cutting for plantations. In this view, plantations are
better than native forests because the trees have more economic value. Moreover, the
plantations continue to fulfill the primary environmental functions of trees: to serve as natural
"scrubbers" (fix CO2) and prevent soil erosion.

6

An alternative approach to sustainable development takes each of the terrils--economic
growth, social equity, and environment--into account in their own right, and then seeks to
find reinforcing linkages between them: Most of the studies in this vein begin by implicitly
or explicitly questioning the orthodox view of economic development. They argue that eyen
with technological fixes and a more realistic economic accounting of environmental losses, 11
rapid economic growth on the periphery (and in the center) will be ultimately -self-defeating
in terms of environmental and human sustainability. As a result, a number of more
ecologically-centered values infuse this alternative approach to economic development. Its
proponents conclude that development efforts should be more decentralized, look for
alternative products and production methods (multiple use of the forest), favor smaller-scale
ever large scale enterprise, and take participation seriously by concentrating on grassroots
development. 12
Equally important, this alternative approach to sustainable development builds on the
assumption that environmental problems in developing nations--especially for the
impoverished of rural areas--are about livelihoods. 13 Thus, the struggle over the
environment is inextricably linked to the larger issues of social, economic, and cultural selfdetermination,. which requires offering vulnerable populations alternatives to exclusive
reliance on the market. This is particularly true for people who are not yet fully integrated
into market economies, or who are at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. In the
forest these include dispossessed or displaced small-scale subsistence farmers, Indian and
settler communities, as well as families, and individuals that derive their living from multiple
extractive activities.
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From this perspective then, environmental concerns, social equity, and economic
development for the rural poor are given equal weight conceptually--not reduced to one or
another term--and then linked. It is also a more holistic approach, since the linkage requires
explicit consideration of the fact that the ecological impact of human activities cuts across
economic activities, as well as social, economic, and political boundaries. 14 This has led to
an emphasis on grassroots development, technologies that mjmic natural processes, and
projects that promote local self reliance and control over a resources in order achieve a more
equitable distribution of wealth.
As will be seen, these two distinct conceptual views of sustainable development stand
at the center of the native forest policy debate in Chile and Venezuela. They define
proponents of market,.friendly developmentalist solutions v. alternative arrangements.
Epistemic communities within the government articulate these points of view, as do societal '
actors (both economic interest groups and the leaders of social movements). Moreover, each
side uses the concepts of preservation and conservation in their discourse to legitimize their
environmental credentials.

In short all are "green," but there are clearly different shades

with significant political consequences.

EXTERNAL FACTORS, POLICYMAKING TEAMS, AND STATE INSTITUTIONS IN
CHILE AND VENEZUELA

This ·paper concentrates on policies developed during the administrations of Patricio
Aylwin in Chile (1990-1994) and Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela (1988-1993). There are
two reasons for the choice of period. One is that the concept of sustainable development and
the emergence of the _native forest issue on the policy agenda in both cases dates back to only
8

about ten years. Secondly, these two governments were the first ones to respond directly to
the issue in their respective countries.
Withol!t neglecting their different histories, this section of the paper draws attention to
the commonalities across the two cases, in order to highlight differences in policy outcomes.
With respect to international factors, both Chile and Venezuela were in various stages of
negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with the United States. As a result, they faced
general pressure to address environmental issues in all of the economic areas affected by
trade, and the forest sector was one of them. At the domestic level, both cases possessed
relatively cohesive policymaking. teams--epistemic communities--that favored the alternative
approach to sustainable development in the native forest issue area. In general, these
epistemic communities had solid institutional backing by a ministry of state--Agriculture
(MAG) in Chile and Environment and Natural Renewable Resources in Venezuela
(MARNR). Ultimately, institutional support included the presidency itself. Yet there was a
closer fit between ideas and policy outcome in Venezuela than in Chile.

Green Conditionality, Redemocratization, and the Native Forest Policymaking Team in
Chile
In Chile, environmental issues--including native forests--received attention in the
Aylwin administration for two reasons. One was that international actors such as the World
Bank, and the United States government were placing more emphasis on the environment as
a condition for loans or for preferential trade agreements. His government would have to
press environmental legislation or suffer the consequences: diminished resources and
opportunities for economic growth. 15 The trade issue loomed large for Chile in particular.
9

After seventeen years of neoliberal economic restructuring it had an open economy that
depended on trade in extractive resources--minerals; fish, and timber--for its economic wellbeing.
The second reason had to do with the fact that Chile was in a process of
redemocratization after seventeen years of military rule in whic~ environmental concerns had
received short shrift. In 1988, a broad center-left coalition of political parties that opposed
general Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship--the Concertaci6n--defeated his bid for eight more
years of rule and won the presidential election of December 1989. Environmental issues had
a place in the new government's program because the environmental movement had formed
part of the political opposition to authoritarianism.
Proponents of the alternative view of sustainable development had begun to emerge in
the 1960s and 1970s in the Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Austral. 16 By the
middle of the 1980s they formed the backbone of the progressive, alternative environmental
social movement largely located in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and think tanks.
With respect to forest issues, they and their students clearly linked ecological concerns and
the sustainable economic use of native forests with an appreciation for social equity in rural

areas. 17
Their intellectual positions affected their policy prescriptions. They believed forest
policy should help conserve and improve native forests, protect· them from substitution for
plantations with exotic species (mainly pine and some eucalyptus), give incentives to create
industrial demand for native species (to reduce pressure for substitution), and improve the
living conditions of peasants and small-holders in forested regions. Their writings
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recognized the need to promote the multiple use of the forest, and grassroots development
efforts for communities in the forest sector. They expressed concern over the biodiversity of
flora and fauna and the integrity of old growth and secondary forests. 18
The Concertaci6n was a broad center-left coalition of political parties. Thus, the
supporters of the progressive, alternative view of sustainable development tended to be
members of leftist parties, or of the left wing of centrist ones, such as the Christian
Democratic Party. They had also formed part of the technical commissions that had
designed the environmental policy platform of Concertaci6n in 1988 and 1989. As a reward
for their participation in the coalition, the center-right leadership of the Christian Democratic
party, of which Aylwin was a member, turned environmental affairs over to the leftist parties
that had helped to forge the administration's platform. These progressive ecologists were not
as moderate as the socialists who occupied more sensitive positions, such as the Ministry of
Economy. But Aylwin's inner circle probably reasoned that environment would not be a
very politicized issue area, as compared to poverty and economic growth. Moreover, as will
be seen, senior administration officials no doubt reckoned that the institutional base within
the government from which the progressive ecologists would operate were not strong enough
for them to do much.
These expectations notwithstanding, the appointments secured a relatively cohesive
team of policymakers that supported the alternative view of sustainable development in the
key government agencies charged with formulating native forest policy. The Corporaci6n
Nacional Foresta! (CONAF) was the principal locus of the alternative epistemic community.
Ordinarily, CONAF is not a very powerful government agency and should not have posed
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much of a threat to the market-friendly developmentalist interests. But CONAF is under the
wing of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG). Thus, the CONAF policymaking team was
immeasurably strengthened by the fact that the minister, Juan Augustin Figueroa, also
supported their central policy recommendations. 19 Ironically, after the native forest policy
issue became highly politicized, president Aylwin himself gave more support to the
alternative epistemic community. This occurred largely because his son was also a supporter
of those views and convinced his father to somewhat discipline the market-friendly group.
Within the Aylw~n administration, native forests constituted one of the first ecological
issues that the new government tackled, and MAG-CONAF adopted a two track strategy.
These two institutions put most of their energies into a legislative effort--the native forest
bill. Because this was by far the most important action taken, this paper will focus mainly
on the implications of the legislative effort. Secondly, MAG-CONAF also began a set of
modest programs to benefit small holders and peasants in forest areas.
Soon after the inauguration of the new government MAG and CONAF started to
design a native forest bill well insulated from both societal pressure or other government
institutions. 2° Key elements of the bill, however, only incorporated a limited range of the
central tenets of the alternative epistemic community's view of sustainable development. At
its core stood subsidies to native forest management to create economic incentives for their
sustainable use. In clear opposition to the powerful forestry industry it was also adamantly
against the substitution of native forest for plantations with exotics. The minister of
agriculture himself repeatedly supported this posture. 21 The proposals also emphasized the
preservation and conservation of the native forest. They sought to prohibit the exploitation
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of large tracts- of native forest in areas where timber extraction and deforestation would cause
severe erosion.
This approach clouded a number of points that gave strength to the holistic vision of
the alternative approach to sustainable development which they had so clearly articulated in
the past. Most significantly, the alternative epistemic community limited its approach to a
narrow economic view of the problem. It was narrow in the sense that the subsidies
provided only a general incentive to conserve native forests, and that success in this endeavor
hinged on the establishment of an industry and a market for native forest wood products.
The issue of social equity was also less distinct than it could have been. There was
no explicit linkage of incentives for the economic use of native woods and the livelihood
needs of peasants and small holders. Instead, the issue was addressed in a rather oblique
manner. Much of the remaining native forest is in the hands of small holders who tend to
live in remote rural areas so the economic incentives should help them. 22

Yet the

alternative epistemic community stopped short of proposing that small holders needed much
more than a general economic incentive and the creation of a. market for their wood products,
such as help with marketing, the establishment of cooperative ventures, and the fostering of
autonomous grassroots development. All ideas which they had proposed in the past.
Finally, a number of concepts that the alternative epistemic community had espoused-which gave it its holistic cast--were entirely lacking from the proposals. With the focus
exclusively on the economic use of timber, it did not address multiple uses of the forest
(including aesthetic value). Moreover, in addition to the lack of attention to grassroots
development, the guiding principles omitted to take into account the importance of local
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ecological factors that might affect exploitation methods and biodiversity. Issues such as
biodiversity and how to strengthen CONAF' s oversight and programmatic capacities were
also absent from the bill. Moreover, the framers of the bill did not consider proposing new
national parks to cover distinctive ecosystems not represented in the National System of
Protected Wildlife Areas.
As a complement to the legislative effort, MAG and CONAF also undertook small
pilot projects which are more explicitly geared to addressing the equity question in the
forestry sector. 23 These programs show that the alternative epistemic community took these
ideas seriously, .and draws attention to their absence in the proposed legislative bill. ·Had
they been included they would have potentially had a greater impact. As they stand, they are
very small and do not reach many families.
There are two such pilot programs. The first one is the peasant reforestation aid
program, which has two subprograms. One is a credit and technical aid program so that
small-holders (up to five hectares) may receive the subsidies for reforestation granted by
Decree Law 701 qf 1974.24 As things stood, that decree had mainly served the interests of
the large-scale forest industry which used them to establish plantations with exotics. The
recent help from CONAF is crucial for small holders because DL 701 only reimburses
expenses one year after they have been incurred. Peasants cannot wait that long. In order to
manage the program efficiently, the administering government agencies have encouraged
peasant organization. Another reforestation program· addresses the domestic subsistence
needs of peasants--fuel, posts, and building materials--and offers aid for the forestation of
areas of up to one hectare. 25 By contrast, the second pilot program explicitly targets
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peasants with standing native forests. Through appropriate technology transfers, the program
helps them to learn how to live off of the forest without destroying it.

External Factors, Forest Policymaking Teams, and the Ministry of Environment and
Renewable Natural Resources in Venezuela

Venezuela's political development differs from that of Chile. It has a history of
uninterrupted democratic rule that dates to 1958. 26 Among other reasons, this has allowed
it to express a concern for environmental issues since the mid 1970s with the creation of the
Ministry of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (MARNR) during the first
administration of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-79). As will be seen, this clearly influenced the
institutional and legal settings and career paths of the forest policy epistemic communities in
the government. Their formative experiences were within the MARNR rather than outside of
government institutions, and they had more legal instruments on which to base their policies.
Yet there are significant similarities with the Chilean case as well. As in Chile, the
native forest issue itself did not receive attention until the last half of the 1980s, · for the
MARNR initially concentrated on urban sanitation and engineering issues. As a result, the
forestry section did not have its own agency or mandate until the second administration of
Carlos Andres Perez which began in 1989. Moreover, prior to the discussion over
sustainable development, both countries had a history of attending to preservation through
parks services that had been established in the 1970s.
By the same token, although by different paths than in Chile, Venezuela developed
networks of policymaking experts in the MARNR who generally took a progressive,
alternative view of sustainable development. Moreover, although the specific institutional
15

settings of those responsible for forest policy were different, in both cases these progressive
epistemic communities had relative autonomy in the agenda setting and policy formulation
stages of the policymaking process. In the 1990s, these epistemic communities ·operated in
fully developed departments that were under the wing of a ministry of state that was
sympathetic to their views, and reported directly to the minister. Finally, the presidents of
both nations were generally sympathetic to their views, or at least not set against them.
Despite these similarities, however, there was a much closer correspondence between
the Venezuelan alternative epistemic community's ideas and policy outcomes than in Chile.
This section of the paper explores the role of international and domestic institutional factors
. in the formation of Venezuela's alternative epistemi~ community. Following that comes a
discussion of how differences in the political e~onomy of these nations shaped the differences
in policy outcomes.

External Factors and the Formation of an Alternative Epistemic Community in Venezuela
External factors played a more direct role in the formation of the Venezuelan
alternative epistemic community than in Chile. This was mostly due to three reasons:
Venezuela had a democratic regime, the internationalist spirit of president Perez, and the
history of the genesis of the MARNR. In the 1970s, when most of South America chafed
under labor-repressive military governments, Venezuela adopted a strategic posture towards
emerging environmental concerns. 27 The first United Nations Earth Summit at Stockholm
in 1972 put environmental issues on the international relations agenda. As the leader of a
political party that was part of the Socialist International (Accion Democratica--AD), it was
Perez' ambition to turn Venezuela into a progressive leader of the third world. Some
16

important AD leaders who were concerned about the environment, especially in urban areas,
and who had linkages to the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank,
convinced president Perez to establish a ministry of the environment. 28
As a new ministry in an administrative system that valued planning, the most
powerful department within the MARNR was the Di,rection of Planning. In keeping with the
initial urban focus of the MARNR many of the top administrative positions went to architects
and engineers, while agronomists also received some posts. Ecosystem preservation received
some attention with the creation of the National Parks Institute (Inparques). Forestry issues,
however, were not considered important and relegated to a minor, very subordinate
agency. 29

It was in the all powerful Department of Planning that international agencies first set
the seeds of Venezuela's alternative environmental epistemic community. This arose from
the experience of designing Venezuela's National Land Use Plan in the late 1970s. This was
a powerful shared formative experience for the directors of the reorganized MARNR of the
e¥1Y 1990s.
In 1979, the MARNR began national land use planning with the project
Environmental Systems of Venezuela. The venture was sponsored by three UN agencies,
UNEP, ECLA, and UNESCO. It divided Venezuela into ecological and socio-economic
zones at the national and regional levels in order to diagnose environmental" stress produced
by Venezuela's development model. That diagnosis provided the basis of policy
prescriptions, such the promotion of urban deconcentration, the creation of multifunctional
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spaces, and environmentally sensitive development programs for the region south of the
Orinoco River. 30
TheiEnvironmental Systems of Venezuela was the foundation of the National Land
Use Plan of the early 1980s, which became the basis for the National Land Use Law of
1983. 31 The Land Use plan retained the overall objectives of the National Systems effort,
and then divided Venezuelan territory into areas most suitable for various kinds of use, such
as urban and transport systems, and development of agriculture, fishing, industry, energy,
and tourism. With respect to forest and biodiversity issues, it gave priority to such goals as
the sustainable use and protection of forests, the rational use of fauna resources, and the
creation of

a system of Areas Under Special Administration (ABRAE) to cover conservation

and preservation issues. 32
The :planning effort, and UN involvement, contributed to the formation of a
progressive 1 alternative epistemic community in the MARNR. First of all, the holistic,
interdisciplinary orientation of the MARNR had its origins during that formative period. The
plans and resulting legislation took into account the relationship between styles of socioeconomic development and the health of the environment, and extolled the virtues of
population deconcentration. The plans called for placing environmental values and principles
at the center of the development strategies for the Venezuela's economic .sectors. They also
highlighted ,the need to foster small-scale producers in the interest of social equity.
With respect to native forests, the Systems of Venezuela and the National Land Use
Plan set down important principles that would be key to the formation of the alternative
epistemic c6mmunity related to this sector. These had to do with the development of the
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ABRAE, which covered approximately 45% of the national territory. The ABRAE combined
economic use of native forest resources with preservation. They reinforced the principle of
multiple use of forests, as well as existing legal norms that established forest reserves .as
preferred areas of sustained yield timber extraction. The ABRAE also sanctioned
preservation of biodiversity via national parks, watershed protection; and agricultural use.
Moreover, the concept of the ABRAE recognized the livelihood needs of peasant
populations.
Upon these foundations, subsequent intense international attention to native forests,
especially in tropical areas, found fertile ground in Venezuela during the second
administration of Carlos Andres Perez, which began in 1989. Ideas developed or advanced
by UNEP and international nongovernmental organizations such as the IUCN were acted
upon. These included the establishment of agroforestry programs in forest reserves, a
biosphere reserve and contiguous national park in the new state of Amazonas, attention to the
development and recognition of organizations of indigenous peoples, the creation of wildlife
reserves, and attempts to address the livelihood needs of populations affected by the
establishment of national parks.

Administrative Reorganization. the Alternative Epistemic Community. and Policy Outcomes
If international factors helped shape the formation of a progressive, alternative
epistemic community in Venezuela, ADs return to power in the mid-1980s and the
administrative reorganization of the MARNR in 1989 molded it further, especially in the
native forest issue area. Beginning with the presidency of Jaime Lusinchi (1983-1988), the
MARNR took on greater ministerial profile with the appointments of the brothers
19

Colmenares Fino!, two recogniz~ environmentalists, to head the MARNR. This gave·
administrative continuity to the MARNR's initiatives and to the career paths of top officials.
People who had worked together well in the 1970s were once again colleagues in positions of
responsibility. 33
The MARNR, however, was not organized administratively to respond to heightened
international attention to the twin issues of the conservation of biodiversity and the
sustainable development of tropical forests. As a result, the second presidency of Carlos
Andres Perez gave priority to an administrative reorganization of MARNR--under Enrique
Colmenares Finol--to address these new issues which were the object of such international
interest. This resulted in the formation of the Venezuelan Forestry Service (Seforven), a
Wildlife Service (Pro Fauna), and the Autonomous Service for Environmental Dev~lopmentAmazonas (Sada-Amazonas). 34
These services and agencies were functionally specific. Seforven oversaw the
productive use of the forest. Sada-Amazonas integrated preservation, conservation, as well
as settler, and native cultures policy for the new state of Amazonas. Pro Fauna was
organized to strengthen wildlife preservation, which it has done through the creation of a
system of reserves. 35 Meanwhile, Inparques received greater authority to decree more
national parks. Another agency, the National Reforestation Corporation (Conare) redoubled
its efforts to develop reforestation programs with exotics (caribbean pine) for industrial
use. 36
On the whole, the aggregation of these functionally differentiated departments gives
the Venezuelan_native forest policy its alternative, progressive cast. Individual service
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directors may not necessarily fully embrace the alternative view of sustainable development.
Yet largely because of their general common formative experience, and because of the nature
of the administrative reorganization, they nevertheless see their efforts as complimentary.
Service and department heads are cognizant that each in their own function and jurisdiction
contributes to the larger goal of promoting an alternative vision of sustainable development.
Moreover, even though individual directors may emphasize either production, preservation,
local populations or wildlife according to the function of their department, they also address
some of the other concerns in their policies because they are aware of the interconnectedness
of the problem of sustainable development. In short, they realize that both the factors that
they stress and the holistic vision that they collectively represent are distinct from the
prevailing market-friendly view of sustainable development.
With these clarifications in mind, what are the specific policies of these new and/or
refurbished agencies? To what extent do they contribute to a progressive, alternaµve view of
sustainable development? What linkages exist between the different agencies and what is the
source of their cooperation?
The director department heads of Seforven (all forest engineers) undertook a dual
mission. First, they began to implement plans they had developed in the mid-1980s to
stimulate the expansion of the native forest timber industry. 37 To this end, they introduced
and/or began to enforce sustainable yield management of the native,forest reserves set aside
for such use by the land use plan and law. Seforven's required the extraction of timber in
accordance with rotation cycles of commercial species, mandated reforestation with the same
species, and charged stumpage fees. Seforven also levied penalties to companies that failed
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to comply (confiscation of timber and suspension of activities rather than fines). Last but not
least, Seforven protected the common lands of indigenous peoples who lived within a
particular concessioIJ..
The system works relatively simply in the forest reserves of :&stem Venezuela North
of the Orinoco River on the Guayana shield. These are remote areas where, for the most
part, extraction is just beginning. However, Seforven's approach is somewhat different in
Western Venezuela North of the Orinoco where there are denser settlement -patterns. There,
the principal forest reserves had been depleted by the expansion of the agricultural frontier.
The process had been aided by the activities of the National Agrarian Institute, the land
reform agency (IAN), in conjunction with local politicians who gave land titles to all who
cleared forest areas in return for votes. 38 This situation gave rise to Seforven's second
policy approach to the forest reserves, for Seforven had to squarely address the problem of
the livelihood of peoples in those areas.
To that end, and in keeping with the alternative view, it began a social afforestation
and agroforesty program in the Ticoporo and Caparo reserves. 39 The program developed
the concept of multiple use of the forest and sponsored peasant organization. Seforven
turned to the social afforestation program as a means to recuperate lost forest cover. This
meant that the existing population could maintain the land they had been working, were
prohibited from cutting more forest, and were obligated to reforest significant portions of
their lands, which also contained some of the remaining native forest stands. These new and
existing forests would provide fuel, construction materials, shade for livestock and crops, and
protection against erosion. The program also required organized peasant participation in the
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management of the social afforestation program. 40 On the strength of that experience,
Seforven began to cautiously expand agroforestry programs to the forest reserves of Eastern
Venezuela and South of the Orinoco. 41 Thus, Seforven hopes that it can avert massive
deforestation in those regions without threatening the livelihoods of the local population.
Sada-Amazonas is in charge of native forest management in most of the region south
of the Orinoco within the newly established state of Amazonas. Its director, and department
level heads, are acutely aware of the need to balance productive, multiple use of the forest
with preservation. They are also sympathetic to the idea that the fruits of that use should be
for the local communities rather than the elite in Puerto Ayacucho, the capital of Amaz6nas.
Moreover, they believe that'local organization, especially of the indigenous population, is an
important tool to achieve those goals. 42
In keeping with this general outlook, Sada-Amazonas' main task at the moment is the
oversight of a newly decreed Biosphere reserve. This concept was developed by the United
Nations Man in the Biosphere program, and incorporates many of the interests of alternative
view of sustainable development. Biospheres seek to conserve biodiversity through the
preservation of core areas. They also seek to respond to the livelihood needs of indigenous
populations and established colonists by establishing areas of sustainable use, known as
buffer zones. Other goals include protecting native populations from cultural shock and
promoting the organization of local communities in the interest of developing autonomous
grassroots efforts. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, Sada-Amazonas is carrying
out its Biosphere reserve program with the aid of the German Agency for Technical
Cooperation (GTZ). 43 The GTZ itself has contributed much to raising the consciousness of
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the Venezuelan directors of Sada-Amazonas with respect to livelihood issues and grassroots
development.
Inparques has a strong preservationist orientation, which is also a facet--or goal--of
the holistic, alternative view of sustainable development. It has redoubled its efforts in the
1990s under new leadership, with a mandate to create Il).Ore parks and national monuments.
The emphasis here was in Amazonas with the creation of large new national parks in
Amazonas and
monuments. 44
. . a number of national
.
In general, Inparques contributes to alternative cast of the MARNR because
preservation is also a component of the alternative view of sustainable development.
However, for Inparques to fit more squarely within the alternative view of sustainable
development it will have to correct more for its preservationist bias. This is because there is
a conflict between the strict preservationism of parks services in general and the livelihood
needs of local populations, especially indigenous. 45
The problem is penetrating the consciousness of the top leadership of Inparques.
They have made some attempts to address this conflict in a way mote consonant with the
alternative view. But this has been restricted to coastal or western mountain areas rather
than in forests. 46 The issue is heating up in the new Amazonian parks. Many indigenous
nations inhabit the region. Their leaders and friends among NGOs and in academic circles
are pressing the issue. As ~a result, Inparques and the national legislature are wrestling with
special regulations for the region. 47
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SOCIAL FORCES, THE STATE, AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NATIVE
FOREST POLICY IN CHILE AND VENEZUELA

On balance, then, both Chile and Venezuela had progressive, alternative native- forest
policymaking teams in the beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, these policymaking teams
enjoyed the support of a major ministry of state, in administrations whose presidents gave
more importance to environmental issues in general, and forest policy in particular. Despite
these similarities, policy outcomes in the two cases did not equally reflect the alternative,
progressive cast of the policymakers. In Chile, the intellectual concern over the multiple use
of the forest, local autonomy, grassroots organization and development, protection of native
rights, and preservation was less explicitly and extensively addressed than in Venezuela.
This was undeniably partially a result of institutional and legal differences. Conaf is
a smaller organization within a sectoral ministry--MAG--that has other responsibilities
besides safeguarding the environment. The MARNR is a specialized agency. Thus, there
- are staffing and budget considerations that must be taken into account. Moreover, the
MARNR has developed legal instruments over the last 20 years which are also lacking in
Chile. The Land Use law is perhaps the most salient example. It established forest reserves
and other protected zones, and clarified property rights in those areas.
Yet there was another important difference that also influenced the policy outcomes in
the two cases: the different political economies of Chile and Venezuela. This affected the
nature and strength of social forces that might be opposed to the alternative view of
sustainable development. Chile had a powerful private sector forest industry geared to the
substitution of native forests for plantations with exotics, and that was vital for national
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economic performance: it contributed almost one billion dollars in export earnings. Within
the context of a free-market economy--with substantial private land ownership--they exercised
considerable influence over the emphasis that the alternative epistemic community took in
Chile, and in the final outcome. Meanwhile, Venezuela, an oil economy, had no such
powerful private sector forest industry groups. The existing forest industry already used
native forest for timber, but it was a weak domestic market-oriented industry that contributed
little to GNP and virtually no exports. Moreover, most forest lands were in marginal areas
and publicly owned..

The Struggle over Native Forest Policy in Chile
The characteristics of Chile's political economy constrained the progressive,
alternative native forest policymaking team. Chile's emphasis on free-market economic
restructuring from 1973 to 1988 had strengthened the private sector in general, and the
forestry industry in particular. This had two important consequences for native forest policy.
(

One was that the general orientation of the economy and the strength of the private sector
within it exerted indirect pressure on the alternative epistemic community to limit its
alternative policy initiatives in a strategic act of selfcensorship. As a result, t}J.e
policymakers ih CONAF concluded that by concentrating. on a few. measures their efforts
could not be dismissed as the actions of hopelessly out of touch radicals. And, they could
muster support for a key policy instrument, rather than dissipate their institutional and
congressional support. Secondly, the private sector felt sufficiently confident to launch
strong, direct opposition to the alternative epistemic community.
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Economic Structure and the Forestry Industry
The struggle over native forest policy in Chile, and the constraints under which the
alternative policymaking team labored, are best understood in relation to two historical
developments. The first one of these was neoliberal economic, social, and political
restructuring under military rule from 1973 to 1989. The second one stems from the bargain
struck between the political opposition to the dictatorship and the supporters of the
dictatorship.
With respect to the first point, during seventeen years of authoritarianism,
policymakers labored to install a new liberal order, one in which export oriented, free market
relations would define the economic and .social systems. The state, of course, should have as
little involvement in the economy and society as possible. These were spheres best left to
the creative energy of private, individual initiative. The export component of Chile's
neoliberal economic restructuring effort concentrated on expanding extractive activities,
particularly in the mining, fishing, and forestry industries. In order to develop the forest
sector, the military government designed an industrial policy to rapidly stimulate tree
plantations of exotic commercial species, principally radiata pine, but also some eucalyptus.
Decree Law 701 of 1974, which the forest industry helped to formulate, was the
principal legal instrument of the dictatorship's forest policy. DL 701 subsidized 75% (up to
90 % in some years) of the costs of reforestation for commercial plantations. With this
sizable direct subsidy the total areas forested with exotics shot up from about 200,000 ha. in
1974 to approximately 1.3 million in 1988. Reversing past law, an additional decree in 1975
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authorized the export of wood products regardless of value added, and that made the export
boom in timber: and chips possible. 48
Moreover, in reaction to the socialist government of Salvador Allende which the
military had overthrown, DL 701 promoted private sector ownership of this economic·
resource, and most plantations are now in private hands. Ownership is highly concentrated
in a few large Chilean companies--sometimes in association with foreign firms--that are part
of Chile's most powerful conglomerates. 49 Exports of raw logs, wood chips, sawn wood,
and cellulose have become leading foreign ex:change earners for Chile, almost US$900
million in 1990. 50 Thus, concentrated ownership and export success have made the forestry
industry a vital sector for the Chilean economy. This forms the basis of the considerable
power of these industrialists.
The expansion of the plantation-based export-oriented forest industry eventually put
serious pressure on native forests in some regions in Chile. Initially, forest companies
established their' plantations in the coal mining zone of Concepcion, and then expanded to
eroded and sand. covered lands in the VII and VIII Regions. However, the plantations
eventually began to compete with native forests after the denuded areas near existing forest
operations were reforested. Firms then cleared native forests to make way for plantations
with exotics. 51 The process accelerated after 1988 due to exploding demand for short-fiber
wood chips, a profitable short-term use of the native forest. After the native forest was cut,
exotics were planted or the land was turned to agricultural and ranching uses. Moreover
Chile's powerful timber companies have expanded their operations to the IX, X, and XII
regions. 52 In short, by the 1990s large forest companies tied to the international pulp and
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paper industry were clear cutting large tracts of native forest to use the short fiber wood
chips for export and substitute them with plantations of faster growing exotic species.
The export oriented, free market thrust of the Chilean economy laid the foundation
for strong supporters of a market-friendly developmentalist approach to sustainable
development. Their locus was mainly in the private sector, of which Empresarios por un
Desarrollo Sostenible and the Corporaci6n de la Madera (CORMA) were the most important.
The former was a working group of the industrial sector's peak association--the Society for
Industrial Development (SFF). CORMA was the powerful association of the forest industry
proper, which was affiliated with the SFF. Other adherents of this view included a few think
tanks, of which the Centro de Investigaci6n y Planificaci6n del Medio Ambiente was the
most important. This shows that the environmental social movement itself was split between
these two conceptions of sustainable development. Moreover, some socialists who believed
in rapid industrialization over ecology, and who affirmed that environmental problems can be
solved by adding technology to existing industrial processes also support the market-friendly
developmentalist view. 53
With respect to the forestry sector, the proponents of the market-friendly
developmental approach to sustainable development preferred policies with the following
characteristics. Native forest policy should establish clear cut distinctions between private
and public property. To this end, state regulation and conservation efforts should confine
themselves to public lands; this meant forested areas which for one reason or another were
not apt for productive use--meaning commercial exploitation. But in private lands apt for
forestry activities--some five to seven million--the state should not regulate exploitation.
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Moreover, the state should pay the owners of such forests for the opportunity costs of
restrictions on their economic use. 54

Indirect Pressures on Chiie' s Alternative Epistemic Community
Due to the market economy, and the nature of the transition to democracy in Chile,
supporters of the market-friendly developmentalist view of sustainable development exerted
substantial indirect pressure on the progressive, alternative epistemic community in the new
dem.ocratic government for two reasons. First, Chilean socio-economic elites enjoyed a solid
structural advantage in the Chile that emerged from the dictatorship in 1989. In Chile's freemarket economy, capitalists were largely responsible for the investment that was producing
sustained high economic growth rates. This was a powerful incentive for policymakers to. be
responsive to these groups.
Secondly, the bargain that the political opposition to the dictatorship--the
Concertaci6n--struck with the supporters of authoritarianism added to the structural strength
of the private sector. Between 1983 and 1985 a coalition of business and landowning elites
negotiated changes in Chile's free-market economic model that led to the sustained high
economic growth rates of the late 1980s. 55 In the absence of deep divisions among the
supporters of Pinochet's military government, to gain their support for democratization the
Concertaci6n promised to retain the free-market economic policies of the authoritarian
period. In this manner the political opposition sought to assuage the fears of socio-econo·mic
elites who worried that the Concertaci6n would attempt to reverse those policies.
In addition to this political agreement, market-friendly socio-economic forces also

enjoyed important institutional protections. First, the authoritarian constitution of 1980 had
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electoral rules that virtually guaranteed the dominance of right wing political forces in the
senate, which had an absolute veto power over any legislation. 56 Second, the
Concertaci6n's commitment to economic orthodoxy and the accompanying liberal,
minimalist, nightwatchman state had significant consequences for the new government's
ability to deliver on its promises for increased social equity.
The Concertaci6n had promised to address growing income inequality, to improve
government services in health and education, and to review labor laws. However, the
military government had stripped public administration resources to the bone, and the Aylwin
administration was committed to the same principles of fiscal austerity that the military
government had labored so hard to set. As a result, the new government was more
successful at maintaining economic growth than in redressing equity questions. Neither
funds nor disposition existed for greatly expanded provision of social services on the part of
the new administration. 57
These circumstances strongly conditioned the strategic choices of the otherwise
institutionally well-positioned alternative epistemic community in the native forest policy
issue area. They largely determined the native forest bill's narrow economic focus, and its
lack of more explicit commitment to social equity for peasants and small-holders. The
alternative epistemic community realized that the policymaking process made it impossible
for CONAF and MAG to push through legislation that asked for funding to implement a
wide range of programs, such as multiple use of the forest, cooperative ventures, the
purchase of forests to incorporate them in them the SNAPSE, changes in labor laws, etc.
Given these limitations, the alternative epistemic community decided that the only way to
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save native forests was to create an industry for its timber. Only this could effectively
counteract the powerful plantation-based private interests in substitution. If sustainably
managed native forests could contribute to both the nation's GDP and balance of trade, the
lack of interest in its conservation might be reversed. 58
By the same token, this context explains why the social questions were relegated to
pilot programs designed by CONAF. As programs, rather than laws, CONAF had greater
discretionary authority over them. The programs, were very modest due to fiscal constraints
and staffing restrictions, a result of the Concertaci6n's commitment to a liberal state
model. 59
In sum, strong as the alternative epistemic community's institutional position was, it
found itself constrained at the outset by the structural position of the private sector in Chile.
Business derived its power from a number of sources. One was their privileged position in a
thoroughly market based socio-economic system: their investment was crucial to continued
ra~id economic growth. Secondly, private interests also had decisive allies in the senate, a
gatekeeping institution. Thirdly, the Concertaci6n had explicitly agreed to conserve the
market policies that formed the basis of rapid economic growth in Chile, and which
reinforced the structural power of market-oriented social forces. In this context, so
unfavorable to challenges to economic orthodoxy, the real significance of a solid institutional
position and a cohesive policymaking team for the -alternative epistemic community was that
despite these systemic constraints it was able to partially imbue policy proposals with its
ideas.

32

Direct Social Pressure and Politicization: The Forest Industry and the Market-Friendly
Developmental Epistemic Community
If the alternative epistemic community found itself indirectly constrained by the
structural position of market-friendly socio-economic forces, it soon found itself in a direct
struggle with those groups. The events that followed demonstrated that in the presence of
powerful private sector actors, alternative epistemic communities can expect resistance to
their proposals. This was a major source of politicization in the Chilean case, and confirms
that environmental issues are more than purely technical matters. More importantly,
however, the ensuing conflict revealed that the Aylwin administration itself was riven by
rival epistemic communities: alternative and market-friendly. As a result, complex alliance
patterns emerged between these competing epistemic communities and like-minded social
forces. The combination of strong industry groups, rival epistemic communities, and
alliance-building across state and societal actors made the struggle that followed particularly
sharp.
Forest industry interests and the representatives of the market-friendly epistemic
community were not initially involved in the design of native forest policy. But they quickly
raised a challenge to the alternative epistemic community by forming an alliance of likeminded state and societal interests. Consequently, towards the end of 1990 the battle lines
were quickly drawn over the question of property rights, the freedom to clear cut privately
owned native forests in the interest of short term economic gain, and then to substitute them
with plantations of exotics.
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The issue erupted over the Terranova case. The directors of the Compafifa de Aceros
del Pacffico (CAP) a large Chilean conglomerate wanted to further diversify into the
lucrative short fiber wood chip export industry. To this end, they formed Terranova, a joint
venture with a Japanese consortium. Terranova owned substantial native forest holdings in
the X region. But it required a permit to clear cut native forests. In order to get around
CONAF it approached the ministry of economy for approval of the project, which was
granted. The ministry was clearly more interested in meeting economic growth targets than
ecological concerns; 60
If private timber interests had found an ally in the representatives of the market-

friendly developmentalist epistemic community in the Ministry of Economy, ·notably the
minister himself, the societal interests that supported the alternative view did not remain
quiet. They quickly mounted a highly visible media campaign to denounce the timber
interests' attempted end-run around CONAF. This was led by CODEFF, the best known of
the alternative environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Preservationist NGOs
also supported them. 61 In a very real sense they became the societal allies of the
beleaguered alternative epistemic community in CONAF and MAG. Together these likeminded social and state interests formed a countervailing alliance.
The presidency, true to its consensual policymaking style, formed an inter-ministerial
commission to set guidelines in this issue area. pending the promulgation of the native forest
law. The commission included the Ministers of Agriculture, Economy, Finance, General
Secretariat of the Presidency (Segpres), and National Property ffiienes Nacionales). 62 The
positions they took revealed the existence of broader competing epistemic communities in the
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government, and laid bare their institutional power bases. The most intractable antagonists
were the Ministry of Agriculture which sided with the alternative approach, and the Ministry
of Economy on the market-friendly developmentalist side, largely due to its commitment to
the government's economic growth targets. Generally less adamant yet still clearly
identifiable were the positions of Christian Democratic led Ministry of Finance and Segpres,
which supported the market-friendly view, and National Property (headed by the PS/PPD)
which argued for the alternative approach. 63
The divisions clearly ran deep and cut across party lines within center-left political
parties, with socialists being the most pro-growth oriented groups on the left (they headed
economy). Had it not been for the cohesiveness and st~dfastness of the alternative epistemic
community, backed by a ministry of the standing of Agriculture, the combined weight of
Economy, Finance, and Segpres would probably have defeated its proposals. In any case,
the inter-ministerial commission failed to arrive at a consensus, although it did expose the
degree of polarization over this issue.

The Search for Consensus: The National Forestry Commission
The public conflict over the Terranova case involved both government agencies and
societal forces and revealed the alliances among them. The fact that the inter-ministerial
commission had to be formed at all stood as a testament to the power of market-friendly
social forces--the forest industry-,..which sought out allies in government in order to defeat the
alternative epistemic community. Their strength, the public conflict, and the impasse in the
inter-ministerial commission also meant that the ministry of agriculture and CONAF could no
longer formulate the general native forestry bill by themselves. To stay within the hounds of
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the Aylwin administration's commitment to a consensual policymaking"style, the formulation
\

stage of the policymaking process would now have to include the relevant government,
societal, and academic forces. To this end, in the first quarter of 1992 MAG formed an
advisory group called the National Forestry Commission (CONAFOR), which also included a
native forest subcommission. MAG and CONAF were supposed to use the subcommission's
recommendations as a foundation for the native forest legislative bill.
Like the inter-ministerial commission before it, CONAFOR again revealed that rival
conceptualizations of sustainable development underlay the fault lines of polarization in the
native forest policy debate. They ran deep in government and society alike, and
CONAFOR's structure lent itself to complex alliance patterns between state and societal
actors. Government actors in CONAFOR and the native forest subcommission included
CONAF and INFOR (the agency in charge of silvicultural'investigation), as well as the
Ministries of Finance and Economy. As it turned out, none of these supported the
alternative view, for under great pressure, and in accord with his party's wishes, CONAF's
Christian Democratic director sided with developmentalist epistemic community. 64 By the
same token, the societal forces represented in the CONAFOR were also mostly on the market
friendly side. These included CORMA (the industry peak association) and the Centro de
Investigaci6n y Planificaci6n del Medio Ambiente (CIPMA). Both of these were wellfinanced had very capable technical teams. The academic community was more divided.
CODEFF, which took the alternative view had been invited but declined because it felt that it
would legitimize a foregone conclusion, the commission would probably support the marketfri~ndly developmentalist view. 65
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As CODEFF had feared, the subcommission's "consensus document" reflected the
preferences of the market-friendly developmentalist epistemic community. At its core, the
document advocated the creation of'three categories of forests: preservation, protection, and
production. The first two categories covered an area of some 22 million ha. , and the third
one covered about seven million. 66 Forests in areas of preservation were not to be touched
and should be included in the SNAPSE. Protected forests could not exploited either because
they were near watersheds, contained species legally prohibited from cutting, or were on
slopes of over 80 degrees. Most impoqantly, the document argued that productive forests
should be divided into two categories, restricted and unrestricted use. Restricted use forests
were those in areas with slopes of over 45 degrees or that contained protected species.
These could be exploited by selective logging rather than clear-cutting. In unrestricted
productive forests, the document argued that owners should be allowed to use the forest any
way they wanted to, which usually coincided with the short term economic gain. In practice,
this gave owners the right to substitute natural forests for plantations at will. 67 The
consensus document also contained provisions for subsidizing native forest management. 68

The Alternative Epistemic Community Strikes Back
Subsequent events clearly confirm the importance for policy outcomes of a cohesive
team of experts and strong state institutional sources of power. The subcommission's
recommendations had reflected an uncompromising posture 6n the part of the forest industry
and their government allies with respect to the key issue substitution with exotics. By
classifying forests according to areas of preservation, protection, and production the
document advocated virtual unrestricted use of the "productive" areas. This condemned
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forests in accessible areas to extinction, and negated the possibility of setting a precedent for
the sustainable use of native forests.
The subcommission, however, was only an advisory board and the Minister of
Agriculture, a key member of the alternative epistemic community, rejected that position.
He then strengthened the alternative epistemic community by replacing the director of
CONAF with a more :flexible person, one that was not 100 per cent in favor of the marketfriendly developmentalist position;69 Despite these strengths, market-friendly societal
actors--industry groups and their allies in the environmental movement--were still a force that
had to be reckoned with. The general context of the policymaking process still favored
them. This meant that the market-friendly developmentalist's desire for substitution would
also have to be addressed, although from a weaker position as far as industry interests were
concerned.
The subordination of the forest industry's position to the alternative epistemic
community was largely due to the fact that president Aylwin basically ordered the state
interests that sided with them to compromise. The alternative epistemic community's
position was further strengthened by the fact that president Aylwin himself had some
sympathy for the minister of agriculture's position. 70 In a sense, then, the president of the
republic himself became a "soft" supporter of the alternative epistemic community.
The choice for the directorship of CONAF reflected this presidential disposition. The
Christian Democrats ·under Patricio Aylwin dominated the administration. Accordingly, the
new director still had to be of that party, but someone more :flexible than the outgoing
director, more open to the position of the Ministry of Agriculture without completely
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ignoring the view of the market-friendly developmentalist view. They found this in the
person of Juan Moya, who had been a member of the original native forest subcommission in
the Concertaci6n's presidential campaign.
In early 1992, the native forestry subcommission met behirid closed doors to work out
a compromise between the alternative and market-friendly developmentalist positions.
Neither social forces nor academics participated in these meetings. Nevertheless, social
groups still played a role in the outcome, albeit a more indirect one. They relied on the
alliances they had already established with the rival epistemic communities. Thus, CONAF,
National Property, and the Ministry of Agriculture defended the position of the alternative
environmental movement. The Ministry of Finance, Segpres, the Ministry of Energy and
others supported the position of CORMA. 71
The reformulated bill kept the idea of subsidies for native forest management. It
discarded the notion of three types of land classification, which was the basis for the idea
that productive lands should not be subject to restrictions. Instead, it addressed
preservationist concerns by stating that forests in the SNAPSE, state reserves, and near
watersheds could not be exploited. Most telling, however, were the across the board
restrictions on clear cutting, the basis for substitution. It was prohibited on slopes of over 30
degrees (as opposed to 45% in the consensus document). In addition to this measure,
CONAF introduced the category of manageable native forest, meaning native forests apt for
harvesting, or selective cutting. These often coincided with areas in which the private sector
had wanted unrestricted rights. Moreover, forests that were habitat to endangered native
fauna or flora could not be intervened in order to preserve biodiversity. Substitution,
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nevertheless, was still allowed but would be confined to lands that had substantially degraded
forests that would be very hard to regenerate, moreover, only 25% to 50% of a land owner's
forest could be substituted depending on conditions. 72
President Aylwin approved the bill and formally sent it to congress--the house of
deputies--in April 1992. As of August 1993, it had emerged from the lower chamber with
few significant modifications, went to the Ministry of Finance for a fiscal feasibility study in
the middle of 1993, and was scheduled to go to the Senate. Its supporters expected to meet
stiff opposition there by right-wing political forces that dominate that branch of the
legislature. 73
Although the congress has not yet passed a native forestry law, the examination of the
policymaking stages over which MAG and CONAF had the most direct influence and
control--the period before the bill went to the congress--confirmed two expectations. First,
that ideas and state institutions in the form of cohesive epistemic communities clearly
influenced policy content. They framed the bill in terms of the alternative approach to
sustainable development. Second, the outcome also depended on the direct and indirect
action of social forces. They limited the extent to which the alternative epistemic community
could imbue the bill with its view of sustainable development. In so doing, market-oriented
social groups forced the alternative epistemic to relegate such ideas to small projects where
they could not have larger implications for the forest industry.
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Social Forces, International Actors, and the Political Economy. of Native Forest Policy in
Venezuela

The opponents of the alternative view of sustainable development in Venezuela did
not enjoy either the structural advantages or direct strength of their Chilean counterparts.
This held true despite the fact that Venezuela was engaged in market economic restructuring
since 1988. Their weakness stemmed from the history of Venezuela's economic development
path which emphasized oil income and heavy basic industry. This meant that the relative
insignificance of the timber industry in Venezuela'.s economy was a contributing factor to the
ability of the native forest policymakers to match policy to their overall alternative
conception of sustainable development. Two additional factors influenced ~e politics of
native forest policy. One was a social factor. NGOs and the organizations of autochthonous
peoples contributed to the design of a more well-rounded alternative approach to native forest
policy in Venezuela. Secondly, international actors played a more direct role in supporting
the alternative epistemic community than in Chile.

The Forestry Industry and Seforven
Venezuela's underdeveloped forest industry exerts little indirect or direct pressure on
Seforven's policies. Their debility, and the structural weakness of the Venezuelan private
~

sector in general, stems from the fact that Venezuela has an oil based economy that has
emphasized the expansion of heavy basic industry. The government obtains most of its
revenue and the bulk of its export earnings from the oil industry. Steel and aluminum
production in the East--Guayana--provide additional resources. All of the oil industry, and a
portion of the steel and aluminum concerns, have been publicly owned since the early
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1970s. 74 With the expan~ion of public enterprise in the 1970s, business peak associations
lost much of their ability to influence public policy, although the heads of very large firms
and conglomerates still managed to negotiate private arrangements with government officials
in policy formulation and, especially, in policy implementation.75
As a result of this development path, the Venezuelan forest industry is economically
weak for three reasons, and, thus, lacks the resources to significantly influence public policy.
First, by comparison to Chile it contributes little to the nation's GNP and virtually nothing to
export earnings. Secondly, firms tend to be small and not very highly capitalized. Third,
since the timber companies do not own the land, the Venezuelan government offers them on
a concession basis. These concessions are areas within forest reserves, which were
established for this purpose by the Forestry Law of 1966 and by the Land use plan, and subsequent decrees. It is also significant that unlike the Chilean case, these firms exploit
native forests for their use in the furniture and construction industry. Moreover, they•are not
involved in the pulp and paper industries and are not interested in substituting native forests
for plantations with exotics.
The contrast to the pulp and paper industry which commands more direct influence
over policies that concern their sector is instructive for two reasons. First, it shows that
economic weight and connections to economic groups are crucial political assets. The sector
is dominated by a. few large, capital intensive firms that are controlled by powerful national
and international conglomerates. 76 The fact that they bring hundreds of millions of dollars
in investments to the. negotiating table secures their directors access and influence over the
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policymaking process--they lobby congressmen, senators, and ministers to back their
legislative initiatives. 77
Secondly, the pulp and paper industry suggests that economic power is more
important for political influence than ownership of land. In Venezuela, the pulp and paper
companies currently import most of their raw materials. Moreover, they do not own land on
which to grow plantations of exotics for pulp. However, this has not kept them from starting
a campaign to privatize 400,000 ha. of government-owned Caribbean pine. They are also
lobbying hard to obtain ownership of public lands on which to grow plantations of Caribbean
pine and melina with government subsidies. Lastly, they can extract much better conditions
under which to exploit publicly owned plantations. 78
The economic weakness of the timber industry allowed Seforven's policymaking team
to design and implement native forest policy that is closely connected to their alternative
views on the definition of sustainable development. Meanwhile, the forest companies
welcomed the opportunity to exploit new forest reserves in Eastern Venezuela, but resented
Seforven's introduction and/or stricter enforcement of sustained yield harvesting and
reforestation practices. In their view, these requirements substantially reduced the
profitability of their enterprises. 79 Left to their own devices many--but not all--of the
companies would probably engage in highgrading practices, thus depleting the economic
value of native forest stands, and encouraging their clearing for subsistence agriculture. 80
The timber industry also opposed Seforven's relatively extensive agroforestry projects
in western Venezuela. Concessionaires wanted the colonists that had invaded forest reserves
over the last 20 years thrown out. 81 They viewed the agroforestry projects as an
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encroachment on their concessions. They would have to give up productive timber stands to
colonists. They also felt that the agroforestry project would draw more settlers, thus forcing
industrialists to give up even more of the dwindling natural resources. 82
However, the timber industry was relatively powerless to redress their grievances.
Both the structural weakness of business in general, and of the timber industry in particular,
rendered the latter's attempts to weaken Seforven's conditions ineffective. They lacked
significant allies in other government institutions that might have pressured MARNR and
Seforven to reduce the stringency of their conditions. Forestry firms are simply too small
economically to have private access to powerful bureaucrats in other ministries or to merit
their attention. For the same reasons, their peak association (Asoinbosques) tends to be
relatively ineffectual as well.
This meant that, as a rule, the spokespersons of both firms and Asoinbosques limited
their oppositional activities to direct confrontation -or negotiation with Seforven, rather than
seeking help_ in other quarters. According to available data, they do not seek to participate in
either the agenda setting or formulation stages of the policymaking process. Instead, they
focus on defensive, rearguard tactics. For example, Asoinbosques attempts to influence
policy imp~ementation, particularly in the search for exceptions, but are rarely successful. A
second recourse has been to initiate legal proceedings action against Sefotven on specific
actions. These occasionally lead to compromises over the penalties for noncompliance, but
cannot change the thrust of Seforven' s policy. 83
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Conservationist NGOs and Forest Policy
Social forces are not only relevant to define the opposition to the alternative approach
to sustainable development. They can also be important sources of support. Although
Venezuelan NGOs tend to be more uniformly preservationist in character than in Chile, they
have played an increasingly important role in one respect. At their initiative, they have
begun to aid government agencies like Seforven, Profauna, and Inparques, in the
development and management of discrete, innovative projects to conserve biodiversity.
However, not all NGOs take this posture. Some, like Audobon de Venezuela, prefer to
focus more on research, adopt a more critical, watchdog posture, and fear becoming
dependent on government. 84
Although the practice is not widespread, NGO involvement with government agencies
has had two significant consequences. First, Seforven's association with one NGO-Econatura--has helped to raise that agency's sensitivity to biodiversity issues. In a very real
sense, the association rounds out Seforven's characterization ~s an agency which, under
current leadership, generally supports the alternative approach to sustainable development.
Seforven had valued creating a forest industry based on sustainable yield resource
management, and attempted to promote multiple use of the forest. Now, Econatura is
fostering concern for biodiversity with the creation of undisturbed forest corridors in
economically exploited forests in order to preserve fauna. The idea--popular in international
circuits--was taken up by Econatura staffers who worked hard to convince both Seforven and
a timber company of the utility of the concept. The idea was to link areas that could not be
exploited for reasons of topography. Because little productive forest was lost, the plan
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appealed to both Seforven and the firm. Seforven is considering extending the model to
other concessions as well. By the same token, Econatura runs an institutional strengthening
program for lnparques (mainly park ranger training and investigation). 85
-Meanwhile, other NGOs have begun to facilitate project-based cooperation between
the functionally differentiated MARNR agencies. This is the source of the second important
consequence of the budding relationship between NGOs and the MARNR. Essentially two
projects are involved. One, promoted by Fudena, aims to create a fauna preservation
corridor in Western Venezuela that links dispersed national parks and fauna reserves. 86
Thus, the project involves Inparques, Profauna, and Seforven. The second one, inspired by
Bioma, requires cooperation between Bioma and Profauna and Inparques on wildlife reserve
management on the central-east coast. 87
These examples of project induced cooperation have begun to help the MARNR to
overcome some of the shortcomings of the ministry's functional differentiation. These
include a lack of coordination, and too much bureaucratic turf protection between the
different services. NGO driven cooperation also contributes to the pooling of scarce
resources of those government agencies, along with those of the NGOs themselves,_ which
encourages greater programmatic efficacy.

International Actors, Social Forces, and the Politics of Biosphere Reserve Creation in
Amazonas
The creation of the Alto Orinoco-Casiquiare biosphere reserve and new national parks
in the new state of Amazonas showed how cooperation between state actors, social forces,
and international actors can advance policies that favor the alternative approach to sustainable
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development. Sada-Amazonas and Inp;:trques wanted to create a Biosphere Reserve/National
park complex because they protected an area of 8,400,000 ha., over one third of the state of
Amazonas. The minister of the MARNR supported the idea, but before formally presenting
it as a MARNR initiative he and his collaborators in Inparques and Sada-Amazona had to
overcome opposition by state authorities who wanted rapid economic development. To that
end, MARNR lobbied commissions in congress, such as education, environment, finance,
and international relations, as well as the ministries in those areas. 88 NGOs, the scientific
community, and international actors played an important role in this process.
Each actor contributed in its own way and lobbied different agencies and committees.
For example, Ecodesarrollo, an NGO which promoted grassroots organization and
development had worked extensively with Indigenous organizations for a number of years. It
/

advised the MARNR on how to incorporate the interests of the indigenous community in the
biosphere/park proposal so as to avoid opposition on their part and gain their support.
Ecodesarrollo also helped the MARNR to lobby both the Ministry of Education and the
education committee of congress because they were responsible for Indian affairs. 89 By
showing how the biosphere reserve could help indigenous peoples the MARNR overcame
potential opposition from those quarters. By the same token, biologists helped with the
technical aspects of biodiversity conservation in order ·to gain the support of the
environmental committee. Together, Ecodesarrollo consultants and biologists helped to write
the decree. 90
Meanwhile, the involvement of the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ)
helped to convince the finance committee not to oppose the project. In general the
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committee discouraged the acquisition of new debt to finance environmental problems,
especially in matters related to forest issues. But the particular program that the MARNR
found for the biosphere reserve was a regional grant project with matching funds from the
host government. In other words no loans were involved.
The Chancellory, however, was the most difficult obstacle. In its view, the proposal
forced Venezuela to give up sovereign right over much of Amazonas. They were never
convinced of the merit of the project, but since the presidency did not oppose it, and other
sources of opposition had vanished, the.Chancellory conceded defeat and did not oppose the
decree in the interministerial council that has to approve executive decrees·.
Once the decree for the biosphere reserve/park project was approved, both
Ecodesarrollo and the GTZ played key roles in developing it within the framework of the
alternative perspective to sustainable development. Ecodesarrollo has worked incessantly on
behalf of indigenous peoples in the legal and legislative arenas. By the same token, given
Sada-Amazonas' scant resources, the GTZ has developed the programmatic and operational
aspects of the Biosphere. It has become deeply involved in the livelihoods issue. To that
end it is helping local populations to organize at the grassroots level in order to develop
alternative styles of agriculture and local autonomy. 91
In sum, both NGOs and international actors have helped to round out the alternative

approach to sustainable development in government agencies. Their actions, and government
receptivity to working with them, show that policymaking teams in government learn as they
interact with other organizations. The experience has prompted policymakers to adopt a _
more multifaceted conception of the mission of their agencies. -Moreover, the NGOs and
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external forces also supply invaluable operational and training capabilities in the field. Last,
but not least, they were vital political allies for state actors in the MARNR in the struggle to
decree the Biosphere reserve.
By the same token, the weakness of the socio-economic and political elites of the state
of Amazonas also contributed to, the creation of the Biosphere/park decree. The state is
virtually undeveloped, with the exception of a small area around the Puerto Ayacucho, the
capital. This meant that the regional elites had few staunch allies in most of the relevant
committees and ministries. Moreover, indigenous peoples make up a significant proportion
of the population. While they did not wholeheartedly embrace the idea of the biosphere
reserve, they understood that it offered them a better opportunity in principle than the elites
in Puerto Ayacucho. 92 As a result, their leaders tended to support it, further weakening the
position of the state elites.

COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS
This paper has examined the role of ideas, institutions, social forces, and external
factors in the recent politics of native forest policy of Chile and Venezuela. The general
argument was that the ideas and cohesiveness of policymaking teams--epistemic communities--with cabinet-level backing gives initial impetus to policy design. It was shown that both

'

Chile and Venezuela had teams of policymakers in the native forest issue area that favored
the alternative approach to sustainable development over the market-friendly approach.
Moreover, those epistemic communities had the support of a ministry of state, and even, to a
certain extent, of the president of the republic himself. True to expectation, native forest
policy took on a decidedly progressive, alternative cast.
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Despite these common elements, however, the epistemic alternative community in
Venezuela was more successful in translating its vision into policy than Chile's. Moreover,
there was a far greater degree of politicization over native forest policy in Chile than in
Venezuela. Differences in the history of state formation of Chile and Venezuela partially
explained that contrast. They influenced both the development of the alternative epistemic
community and its institutional, legal, and international basis of support.
Venezuela had a _democratic history of state formation. The social democratic Accion
Pemocratica (AD) party took environmental issues to heart. It created a ministry of the
environment to give coherence to its policy initiatives. The MARNR, in tum, formed a body
of environmental and land use law, and cooperated closely with the United Nations, which,
in general, favors the alternative approach to sustainable development.
These factors had a profound influence on the formation of the alternative epistemic
community in Venezuela. To begin with, it developed within the system of public
administration. Thus, once forest issues became important the MARNR could draw on an
experienced cadre of public administrators who possessed a general, if diffuse, orientation to
an alternative approach to the relationship of environment and development. The history of
the MARNR had a second consequence for the development of the alternative epistemic
I

community in the native forest issue area. One the issue got on the policy agenda, the
coherent articulation of the alternative views was initially more the result of functional
administrative design than the beliefs of individual administrators. However, the service and
department heads were capable of learning, and later began to flesh out underdeveloped
aspects of the alternative view in the areas under their jurisdiction.
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Chile, by contrast, had a history of liberal state formation since 1973 under a military
dictatorship that paid no attention to environmental issues. This meant the supporters of the
alternative approach developed their ideas and linkages outside of government. As a result,
they had a more coherent intellectual view of the alternative approach. Yet, once in the
state, the alternative epistemic community started far behind Venezuela in terms of the
institutional and legal framework to deal with those issues; and they were also inexperienced
at public administration. The fact that they tended to belong to political parties that were
minority partners in the governing political coalition--the Concertaci6n--was an another
limiting factor. All of these elements clearly colored what policymakers attempted to do.
Without denying the significance of these factors, there is nevertheless another
contrast that must be taken into ,account to explain both the differences in the congruence
between the ideas of policymakers and policy outcomes in Chile and Venezuela, and the level
of politicization of the debate over native forest policy. The social forces that opposed the
alternative approach to native forest policy were much stronger in Chile than in Venezuela.
This was the result of differences in the economic development paths of the two countries
since the early 1970s.
Private sector forces were much more well-developed and powerful in Chile than in
Venezuela. They also articulated the market-friendly view of sustainable development more
coherently than in Venezuela. Successful free-market economic restructuring based on agromineral exports turned the timber industry into a vital component of the Chilean economy.
As a result, timber interests could count on allies in other parts of the government.

51

This meant that the private sector i11 general, and the timber industry in particular, enjoyed
structural economic and political strength with which to exert indirect and direct pressure.
First to limit the scope of the agenda of the native forest policymakers, and secondly to
participate decisively in policy formulation. In this context, the coherence and ministerial,..and even presidential--support for the CONAF-MAG policymakers partially curbed the
private sector. Without it, the timber industry would have probably won unconditionally.
By contrast, Venezuela's private sector, and the timber industry in particular, was
'

)

structurally weaker than in Chile. Although in the 1990s Venezuela was undertaking freemarket economic restructuring, until then it had followed a state-led import substitution
industrialization program that did not favor the development of a strong private timber
industry. 93 As a result, the MARNR did not face economic structural factors that it had to
take into account in policy design. Nor did it face overwhelming direct opposition. Because
forests were not vital to the economy, private forest interests lacked allies in other ministries
willing to start a major inter-ministerial jurisdictional dispute on their behalf (although they
did have sympathizers in the Ministry of Development). Given these circumstances, the
MARNR could develop its programs in sustainable yield management, and in biodiversity
conservation without significant resistance.
The two cases, however, revealed that social forces can also be wellsprings of support
for alternative epistemic community, ·and sources for their development. Venezuela had
social forces that, overall, supported the policymakers more than in Chile. Unbroken
democratic rule in Venezuela had allowed policymakers in the forest issue area to engage in
collaborative efforts with NGOs. Thus, NGOs contributed to fleshing out underdeveloped
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aspects of the alternative approach to sustainable development in individual MARNR
services. NGOs, were also very instrumental in turning native populations into supporters
instead of opponents of the MARNR' s plans.
The situation was different in Chile. The recent transition from authoritarianism
meant that many of the policymakers in CONAF and MAG had just been recruited from
NGOs like CODEFF. Because they were coming from outside of public administration and,
thus, had had a long learning period, they were just beginning to think of approaching NGOs
to help fn policy implementation. Equally significant, many NGOs including CODEFF had
opposed the forestry law because it was too limited. Yet NGOs aided the alternative
epistemic community as well. They denounced the aims of the private sector at a crucial
\

moment--the Terranova case; that is, they turned it into a burning public issue. Eventually,
CODEFF supported the native forest bill once the private sector was put in its place
believing at that point that something was better than nothing.
Overall, international factors played a background role in Chile and Venezuela. In
general, rising international attention to environmental issues, including tropical forests,
shaped the demand for action. It also legitimized the claims of groups clamoring for policy
initiatives. The upcoming Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 added to the pressure to
do something.
But there were differences in the degree of impact of international factors in Chile
and Venezuela too. In Chile, by and large, they conformed to the above description. 94 in
Venezuela, however, they played a slightly greater, more direct role. First, the United
Nations helped to form the MARNR and its professionals. Seco~dly, the GTZ performed
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vital services in the project development of the Amazonas biosphere reserve, and in securing
native population support for it.
In the final analysis, the comparison between Chile and Venezuela suggests that

international factors play at least an important background role in the politics of the
conservation and sustainable development of native forests. By the same token, the
ideological orientation of policymakers, and their cohesiveness and institutional backing are
crucial to policy outcomes. They give initial impetus to policy initiatives and can support the
policymakers through rough political weather. Social forces, however, are also vital for
outcomes. The specific groups and their relative strength depends on a country's socioeconomic development path. In countries where the forest industry is a vital component of a
nation's economy one can expect stiff opposition to policies that favor the alternative
approach to sustainable development. Where they are not, one can expect much less
resistance to the alternative view from that quarter. The comparison between Chile and
Venezuela also suggests that social forces are not just sources of opposition. NGOs and the
local population in program areas are also potential wellsprings of support for alternative
native forest policymaking teams.
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